The Analysis Guy

South Africa dismiss hosts Japan with ease

South Africa avoided another major defeat to the Brave Blossoms. The hosts having been the top qualifiers from Pool A had grabbed the attention of the world of rugby. However, the Semi Finals were beyond their reach as they were unpicked by the South Africans. The Japanese had kicked 47%, however it was not there game control that was impressive but their fitness and speed of attacking. Controlling ball against Ireland with 7 more platforms Japan announced intention. Backing up the performance against Scotland by kicking less and preventing their attack. The words of Jamie Joseph rang true through their performance, that they had been preparing for 2 years, whilst Scotland and Ireland had been preparing for the previous week.

South Africa however found it relatively easy to roll the Japanese team. Their superior size and physicality kept Japan pinned back. Despite having a less varied game plan they steam rolled their way into the Semi Finals.

They started well, the try from Mapimpi requiring a little work after a poor tackle from Tamura, hence it not being worth covering here. The SA defence, however to stop Japan in and around the 14th minute summed up the game. An outstanding effort was made by Japan but eventually it was cut down and turned over by SA.

The move starts with a Japanese break down the wing, through Fukuoka. As opposed to the All Blacks kicking strategy, Japan shifted the ball through their hands. The ball reaching Fukuoka unopposed after the blitzing bokke defence is unable to cut off the Japanese attack.

Japan work to the edge of the SA blitz, and are able to expose Kolbe

He manages to round Kolbe, and then regain his feet, protecting the ball in the break down. This simple extra measure, is usually used to gain ground but this time it is merely an extra level of security and allows Japan to play ball away faster.

De Allende scrambles and tackles but Fukuoka gets back to his feet and buys time for Japanese support

The ball is spread from the ruck in the 15m channel. The Japanese line is slightly disorganized but it is able to partially exploit a second opening a symptom of the quick ruck speed. While Japan doesn’t risk the wide ball, wanting to secure momentum and almost going through the centre of the bok defence. They then follow up the partial break by Tamura crashing up. This perhaps gives SA a partial bit of respite.

The Japanese then try a little more deception and play an inside ball near the line. However there is no change in direction. This makes it easier for SA to adapt and keep folding, the proof being Vermuleun’s thunderous tackle.This stops Japanese momentum and acts as a partial damn to the red and white river.

Japan try to break on the inside but SA able to drift with the play

Japan then try and restart. They continue to use two man clearing to great effect. With them changing direction but still managing to get support. However, they then try play slightly to quickly. Unable to get a second man in support and turn over the ball. The Japanese support overruns the break down slightly sliding over the top, enabling De Allande to step in and anchor over the ball. This gives South Africa a penalty and a chance to clear their lines.

Japan latcher gets caught on the wrong side of the ruck as he slips over the top and De Allende is able to win a turnover.

The South Africans then went close through a transition attack in the 33rd minute. However they bombed a clear chance. With Am unable to expose a 3 on 1. Following this, Damian De Allande went over in the 41st minute, only for the half to end for a double movement from him in the build up to him crossing of the line.

The beauty of the performance comes from their ability to turn the screw, especially in the second half. They just pinned Japan back and didn’t let them escape. Japan started possession 7 more times in their own half, than in the SA half. However the key is not where Japan started attacks, but the fact that SA started 5 attacks in their own 22, with Japan starting 11 in their own 22. This shows how hard they struggled to escape the South African stranglehold.

Japan were pinned back starting 11 attacks in their own 22

South Africa’s pressure meant they were camped inside Japans half for most of the game

So whilst SA converted many more chances, this came not as a result of incredible attack but instead the eventual telling of pressure. Japan made gains 23.4% of the time, compared to a SA score of 32.6%. This general statistics while it lacks a degree of empathy, for the ability to break, the South African ability to keep them pinned back and just absorb the pressure as illustrated through De Allande’s turnover shows the strength of the Springbok side. The springbok performance was by no means a finished product but was a warning shot to the rest of the competition as they saw of Japan with relative ease.

All Blacks with masterful performance dismiss Ireland

Irish woes continued at the quarter final stage yet again in Japan. Crashing out as they were crushed by a brutally strong and efficient New Zealand performance. Throughout the World Cup Ireland have played well in patches, starting strong against a Scotland team in a dominant display. However, Ireland had been unable to beat the hosts, lining up this sensational clash for the Quarter Finals. The Japan game had shown them tired and unable to control the game, kicking 11% less than Scotland. In matches where territory is everything, and given the limited opportunities they received Ireland’s lack of maintaining a strategy which had benefited them greatly was a real issue. This was a problem that stalked Ireland in the quarter finals.

However this is not to take anything away from the All Blacks. The variation of New Zealand brought Ireland to their knees. Recording a variation of 46.5% New Zealand showed why they are the masters of International Rugby. For comparison Ireland recorded a variation of 11.1% over 4 times less. This allows New Zealand to defend with ease while Ireland were fighting against a many headed beast.

New Zealand took control, the second Aaron Smith try was crucial in showing the power of set plays. While they don’t immediately score, the isolating act of the NZ attack allows them to really expose Ireland outside.

Firstly, the scrum is dominant and remains square, whilst not over accelerating. Being set in the 15m Channel, allows New Zealand to spread the ball. The dominance of New Zealand means that Ireland are forced to hold their flankers in the scrum and limits their ability to drift and cut off the space.

New Zealand hold the scrum steady and pin down Irish flankers

The key comes from New Zealand’s foreboding threat of the kick. This keeps to Irish defenders trapped back, while Reece is able to hide behind a mass of bodies. While New Zealand use their lack of width to hide Reece, the turned ball from Goodhue gives Reece the opportunity to loop.

Sevu Reece is hidden behind the attack on a loop play isolating Ringrose

This break is then compounded because Gary Ringrose jumps out of the line. Either not seeing the threat of Reece, or wanting to prevent the ball going wide, he jumps and is unable to shut the ball off. This leaves Earls defending the flank by himself.

The penultimate All Balck runner comes carrying hard, the speed at which he travels forces earls to go for him. This is all caused by the isolation of RIngrose. By forcing him to make baiting him into jumping out of the line the All Blacks can sweep round the corner.

The ball is then flung out to Bridge who eats up the meters and gets New Zealand within 5m. This then leaves Ireland having scrambled to try and prevent the score. Stockdale then tries to put pressure on Smith wanting to make the Scrum Half panic. However this early jump allows him space, another example of isolation, Stockdale perhaps feeling he can prevent a quick try with jumping slightly early.

Stockdale shoots trying to stop the play, but exposes a space instead

The Codie Taylor try in the 46th minute took advantage of sustained pressure. However the variety of ways in which they played proves to be a great way to examine the All Blacks entire structure.

Starting with a series of close carries, the All Blacks then attack wider still relying on small carries to make ground. However it is not about scoring every time, New Zealand instead pulling the pieces into place with extreme patience.

New Zealand carefully arrange the play, with close carries

The close ruck carries of New Zealand is what started the play. By using forward close to the ruck it is simple enough for them to expose spaces. It also allows New Zeland to use all their backs to stretch Ireland.

The Kiwis are grouped close and perhaps goad Ireland into poor decisions. Worried by the amount of numbers in the wider channels, on repeated occasions Ireland make digs for the ball. However this merely restricts their line. Slowing down the ball eventually becomes a pointless activity as New Zealand are ready to flick a switch and cut them to shreds.

While this may sound like words for words sake it is so crucial to the All Black attack. The fluidity comes from the variety and comfortableness within multiple situations. So when Beauden Barret attacks wide it forces Ireland to switch the direction of the fold and react to a new point of pressure.

Barrett switches the direction, with pace putting pressure in a different place

However the try doesn’t come from a specific switch of style or new dynamic introduced by the players. It simply comes from well executed skills. The hard carry from Kieran Read brings them close to the line whilst the Irish tacklers double up, they miss the ball. This try was therefore a marrying of many years of practice. The using of 2 playmaker style, the redeployment of hooker and number 8 more centrally all pointing toward a score made through years not merely the minutes of the game.

The New Zealand performance was one of mastery. Controlling everything and dictating the position. This is best shown through Ireland being unable to play their style. Ireland kicked 54% of their possession against Scotland, but against the All Blacks mustered less than 45%. The beauty therefore of New Zealand was their control of Ireland as well as themselves. The variety prevented easy defence, but it mainly forced Ireland to change. Whether it was the pressure, the occasion or the early scores, Ireland looked to try to force a change in plans rather than slip into their groove and play their way. This, a clear side effect of the NZ pressure.

England cut through Australia to confirm place in semi finals

England began their knockout campaign with a test against a strong wallabies team. England had won the previous 6 encounters since being dumped out of their home world cup and Cheika was looking to change the script.

England hadn’t really been tested or needed to show anything spectacular whilst Australia had come with a different plan to most teams, keeping ball in hand, kicking only 42% of ball against Wales with Wales themselves kicking 60% of the ball away. However despite this, they had made lots of ground, progressing 60% of the time, the baulking runners, Kunadrani and Koribete proving to be a handful. This is the game, England were fighting against. One based on possession and running, the clash of style was to make for an interesting game.

The difference can be found just by examining three of the tries. The Koribete try, coming from a lovely inside flick from Jordan Petia, Johnny May’s first try and the Kyle Sincklers try. For England both their tries revolved around a very formulated, incredibly controlled Pod based system. Whilst Australia ditch the mainstay of structure offering lots of singular one off runners creating 2 lines of options spreading their forwards rather than condensing them.

Johnny Mays first try comes from sustained pressure. England started off with a lineout just inside the Australian 50m area. The crash immediately from Tuilagi gives England momentum. While pods can be used for options, the key about the pod surrounding Tuilagi is that it prevents any Australian attempt to win the ball and allows the move to flow.

Tuilagi crashes with a pod of clearers in support

England then spin it wide, the attack relying on Elliot Daly acting quickly and freeing Watson. By carrying hard Watson makes it up to the Australian 22 but crucially has forced Australia scramble. By really attacking the width and forcing this scramble it has actually brought Hodge, Koroibete and Kerevi into make the tackle. This means as England switch direction, Hodge has to work to get to the other wing, while also shortening the Australian defence.

Daly acts as the link in the wide channels after England use a pod to shift ball wide

England then play the ball flat. The two options of Farrell showing that England have momentum, no longer needing two dedicated cleaners. Tuilagi has also simply been able to carry on his line of inquiry. Not having to drift into attack closer to the ruck, instead England maintain their width and strike strongly.

England use a slightly wider spread to crash the ball, with cleaners coming from both sides to generate safe ball

This also allows Tom Curry to sit wider, the flanker playing more as a link man than a crashing physical ball carrier.The simple completion and the width is best shown by the fact that Hodge has had to cover probes on both wings, whilst England have barely had any additional commitments, Tuliagi and May holding their Width and forwards filtering and fitting the England shape.

Tom Curry acts as a link outside while Daly acts as an out the back option

The Koribete try came from some pressure originating in Australia’s own half. The Austrailians

Rather than relying on the pod systems instead used width and staggered lines to stretch England. The attack ran with little subtlety, but the ability to stretch England allowed a floated pass to find Pettita out wide. The ball coming inside and allowing Koroibete to run.

While this seems like a short description, overall the Australians were able to find width and this is what stretched England. Using 1 flat runner held the defence slightly but the damage had already been done.

Working to the edge of England’s rapid defence, the skill from Petatia to flick inside with a micro pod out wide just gave options where Australia needed it. This in essence is the key to attack. A varied game plan with resources where they are needed, is now becoming a crucial aspect of the game plan. While, Rugby geeks can talk about 2-4-2 formations and the benefits of a 1-3-3-1, the simple truth here was demonstrated by Australia.

Australia arranged with 2 solid lines, rather than the distinct pod system of England

They crashed in the centre, worked to an edge and then used two micropods across two phases in totally variant roles to expose the space. The first pod act as cleaners generate space and time for the backs out wide, where Petatia has multiple options preventing England from making an easy decision and nullifying the attack.

Australia use a slight pod but shift ball out back from flat lead man to expose the English defence not he wing

Kyle Sincklers try, showed a second string of the English bow. The crash runners are used again. The ball coming to the lead an often playing off 10. This time moving to Watson with more slow build up, than May’s first. The use of lead men and a traditional pod system being used repeatedly, however, more off 10 than off 9. This keeps Australia entertained, knowing the danger of the lifted ball to a short, lateral runner.

The English have worked to a width. England then play inside back toward the centre. Vuinopola receives the ball, with both him and Sinckler shielding Farrell from Australian pressure. This gives Farrell time to play the ball.

Mako Vuinopola receives the ball and then flicks out back to Farrell to allow a second crash to carry through at a wider angle

This ability for Farrell to pick a pass and perform it is crucial. While everyone talks about playing close to the line, this only works by starting deeper. It is like a battlefield commander sitting on his horse and surveying a battlefield. Whilst if in the infantry line he can see a small chink perhaps, when sat back and given an overarchign view, he can use his forces to expose spaces and create new ones. Giving himself time to perform rather than worrying about being ‘’killed’’ whilst performing the simple skill.

Then after flicking the ball to Sam Underhill, Farrell is able to reorganize and this time, he has a pod off his shoulder containing Curry. England then secure quick ball allowing Farrell to use his reserve playmaker, Elliot Daly. The Full Back came into action again in the wide channels. Quickly and most importantly cleanly to the waiting Anthony Watson. This allows England to make use of the full width of the pitch. Whilst not spreading the ball as quickly as in their first try or as simply as Australia, England’s use of width through variety proved decisive.

Daly attacks out wide, fulfilling that deeper option and freeing Watson on the width

Having reached the wide channels, the ball got played back inside. Mako Vuinopola carries again and then Farrell shifts the ball as England overload the centre channel and Kyle Sinckler takes the flat pass. By using such ballast to create opportunities and then knowing when to go wide to finally prepare the Australain defence was crucial.

Mako Vuinopola carries hard instead of looking to pass, or expose width

As I have referred to on countless occasions during this piece, it was England’s variety which led to the ease of victory. Whilst Australia were committed to a wide game plan they were no different to Wales. The excitement of such wide play papered over the cracks of having an incomplete game. England on the other hand announced themselves as a real and present danger, with a high variety of 31.7%. This ability to change their attack and change the game based on themselves was the key. Australia did prove some threat but the Wallabies were a one trick pony, which England were able to restrict and defeat.

Japan dump Scotland out of World Cup, as Scottish revival comes too late

Lots has been written on the poor performances of Scotland and the success of the Brave Blossoms, who have invigorated the tournament. The lease of life given by the brave blossoms applies not only to the successes of the home world cup but the future of modern rugby. Diverging from traditional rugby patterns and putting an efficiency, skill and fluidity upon the game. The hard work on and off the ball has been key to their success.

In the game against Scotland they continued this trend, working for over 10 phases trying to isolate the defenders through quick ball. This is no better shown than with their use of the traditional pod system. The deliberate targeting of the centre man allows Japan quick clearance. The use of two of these pods in the centre allows them to quickly choose where they want to stress the scottish defence.

Japan try and attack to edge playing out the back of pod

In the clip above stretches Scotland the same way forcing them to a far touchline immediately off a set pice. The use of 2 pods, first Leitch on the previous phase, and now this phase drags scotland into 2 focus points. The second pods action and ability to create this focus point drags in the Scottish.

Japan attacking right to the fringe leading to Matsushima score

However, once Japan carry back into the centre Scotland overfold while Japan attack back to the blindside. Horie runs a sharp angle holding Harris enabling Japan to play behind him and create a partial 3 on 2, which they can finish and Matsushima canters away after Fukuoka’s offload.

There was of course more than a simple 1-3-3-1 formation behind Japan’s attack. However the basic building blocks were constant in everything they did. The structure a pertinent part of the plays Japan made.

Japan use Leitch a physical presence able to eat up yards, win the contact and provide a solid platform out wide.

The above carry from Leitch sets Japan up. He carries out wide, using his pace to find the edge of a Scotland defence who are forced to drift and unable to shut down the Japanese attack.

Japan attack to the centre then immediately look to change direction

Then Japan work it in field, however the pass goes to an isolated man. Scotland are able to slow it up. They make a crucial tackle drawing in an initial clearer. While not damaging it does show the effectiveness of Scotland in this instance.

Horie breaks the first tackle and close proximity to Japan support enables them to continue the break and score

About a minute later however Japan enact strand 2 of their brand of rugby. The high skilled game attacks right through the guts of Scotland. The ability of Tamura to keep changing his line and expose Scottish cover and offload showing a certain familiarity.

Ironically this style of play is an emulation of Scotland. The fast brand of rugby championed by Townsend searching for the quickest ruck time in world rugby played a key role in denying Scotland a Quarter Final place. But while the Japan try comes from constant pressure Scotland are far more comfortable attacking from transition.

Scotland attack immediately off kick return and make a break in 15m

Scotland’s third try started from a kickoff return. The shackles have been taken off they target Japan in the 15m channel and then arc in field.Thi takes them to the 22. The attack then continues to drive for the Japan try line. Scotland do aim to revert to their strengths the flowing wide open attacks. The sort that brought out them roaring back at Twickenham. However, the Japanese defence shuts down their options.

Scotland try to go wide on both occasions but are forced inside

Japan play with high pressure and negate Scotland

As you can see in both of the above clips, Scotland are trying to get the ball into the hands of their ‘biggest’ threats. They seem to have become bogged in a reliance on their biggest players, Hogg and Russel trying to run through the Japanese and play to an edge, brought tighter due to the pressure by Japan.

Close support play enables Scotland to grab their 3rd try

However, after these failed probes, the Scots eventually break the Japanese. Cohesion allowing their forwards to play close to the line break through and scoring. Gray combining with relatively new cap, Blade Thomson, to put Zander Fagerson over.

The Scottish team looked rusty and disjointed at the beginning. They lacked the speed and opportunism that has helped them prosper. This is no doubt due to aggressive Japanese defence but also a slow delivery. While no doubt faster than normal Horne made an immediate difference and helped to bring Scotland back. Japan on the other looked prepared their energetic pod system delivering ball quickly for outside backs to really stretch Scotland. Whilst some of their tries were opportunistic their control and ability to play multiple phases to score marks the rapid improvements they have made since 2015 and miracle in brighton, to the ‘’confirmation’’ campaign of 2019.

Japan scored lower but manage to pull through and secure a QF

Tonga and the USA show bright patches in pool of death

Tonga and the USA had been dealt a hard blow before the World Cup. With little chance of progression this World Cup represented an experience rather than a fully open opportunity. While the US had done well at home in a few games at home, they were struggling with form, and went into the game as underdogs. Meanwhile Tonga had performed well, restricting England and stopping them getting a bonus point until the closing minutes of their game and pushing France all the way.

The tongans are clearly a rugby power, not necessarily a top side but the performances they gave, show a significant depth of character, and skill. In all their games they had over 50 platforms from which to attack. 53 of their 161 platforms were in the opposition half, (stats taken from all games) apart from Argentina. This means they had 18 attacking platforms per game, yet in those 3 games scored only 47, an average of 15 points. This means they came away with less points than attacking platforms.

To make the step up therefore it is clear what Tonga must do. They have a great attacking machine, with a solid base of talent but to make a jump they need to start converting chances. Against the US, they couldn’t do this surrendering possession 85.2% of the time.

The surrendering of possession held both teams back. USA are on the left side, and Tonga are on the right.

The key here is that when Fiji played Georgia, teams of a roughly comparable level in that this is where Tonga should be aiming. Fiji recorded 58.3% ball lost whilst Georgia surrendered ball 70.6% of the time.

Ths 15% gap between Tonga and Georgia is crucial. When using the lower of the two games platforms 37 – Georgia – it corresponds to 5.55 platforms which end with ball being lost. When this is then used calculate against Points per platform, taking Tongas v USA (0.6) this mean 3 points a game.

As a result, while not a big change it is clear they are leaving points on the park. It becomes even more staggering when using Fiji’s as a comparative measure. The difference 26.9%, giving a platforms ‘Lost’ of 13. Resulting in a projected points lost of 8. This points difference is clear. THey are about 8 points behind Fiji.

Obviously the maths is very concise and selective, given it covers just one game. But the difference in conversion rate is clear, Tonga sacrificed 8 points per game. A total that could have put them in reach of France and made a shock slightly more likely.

USA on the other hand, need to give themselves more of a chance. In their games against Tonga, England and France they kicked the ball surrendering ball with that kick 65 times (v Tonga 26/29) (v Fra 19/26) (v Eng 20/23). There is most certainly a link between success and kick rates, but the US were gifting the opposition a platform at times. England able to exploit pressure from poor kicking, using Vuinopola in the back field.

The vast amount with little chance of regaining the ball should and will change. The MLR will help develop kickers and game control, rather than a reliance on the free flowing 7s players. IT also will offer a pathway for US rugby players to the UK. This statistic will improve and the US will become a major threat once they can start to have a tight game plan, with additions rather than additions forming the game plan.

For both teams this world cup was going to be hard. They performed admirably and their game was a good one to watch. While Tonga exposed some rush defence for Siale Piataus birthday present and final game, the US were able to really attack well from transition. Both team showing they have an arsenal of weapons to damage modern teams

Australia struggle against resilient Georgians

Australia and Georgia shared a close affair in which Australia struggled to break down the Georgians, and made intriguing watching. The game became ever more tense for the wallabies, as up until the 60th minute they were unable to distance the lelos threat.

The lack of inventivity really caused issues for Austrlaians, as well as a lack of ability to exploit space, perhaps pertained by fielding the 11th half back combination in the last 4 years. The lack of cohesion manifested itself obviously in the Austrlain play.

Australia have a great maul platform and are moving forward

Take a look at the example above. The forward dominance is clear from Australia. And whilst the Georgia player on the right of frame is holding two away from the maul, the general forward momentum is a great platform. Yet whether through lack of trust or a blind adherence to the game plan Australia don’t free the ball. Instead, losing control of the maul and getting swamped as shown below.

They lose this platform and instead lose momentum

While this is to some extent judging by outcome, the Austrlians should have been able to take advantage of such a simple platform. The problem however should be easily fixed. Australia have a knack for scoring close to the line, breaking through with strong runners for example Hooper v Wales at this world cup. Attacking with width at the 3rd defender and enabling easy yardage and scores.

However in this case there is very limited width. Australia are carrying hard but don’t identify the space. In this passage of play there were 11 phases, 9 of which don’t have any degree of width the other two, simple passess to close runners.

Australia don’t attack the space immediately

Australia can’t identify the space and don’t have any real speed. They do switch the sides of attack stretching Georgia slightly, but at this point, there is a poor identification resulting in failed probe. The outcome of this simple error, running at Georgian bodies is a scrum to the Lelos.

Australia aren’t able to exploit the space, and Georgia force a knock on

Australia did manage to eventually score tries, and it is the second of these I will focus on. At around 60 minutes, Australia have a lineout and use it as a platform to send a big runner straight at Georgia.

Unsurprisingly the blunt method doesn’t garner any real short term gains.

Australia attack round the corner manipulating the Georgia defence

However it enables Genia to manipulate the Georgia defence. The Aussie 9 sniping around the fringes, his two step passing motion drawing the defence on him rather than allowing an intercept. As well as this, Australia have come with a plan of attack involving guile. The 2 pods of 3 working round the corner (this phase and the one previous) have drawn Georgia in.

Georgia defence cuts of the options out wide

Whilst Georgia are disorganized, with a solitary shooter they are able to catch Leialiafano behind the gain line. This forces Australia to attack off slower ball. However a flatter pass by Genia cuts off 1 aussie and finds the hooker roaming in the outside channels, against his opposite number.

This exploitation of a lack of reorganisation is key. Whilst the offload goes to ground and Koribete has to retreat onto he makes his break by attacking forwards, unable to match this form of his physical prowess and allowing him to break the gain line.

Australia have 2 backs unmarked in the wide channels

Overall, Australlia made tough work of Georgia. The Lelos put up some real fight, but eventually Australia’s Tier One fitness saw them through. Whilst there was some bluntless and they lacked any real penetration, the Aussies flicked the switch when needs be and managed to win a game characterised by Georgian grit.

Australia really played poorly as shown by the incredibly low rating

Wales win, after Fiji dominance

Fiji may have had a 2007 in their sites in Oita. The Fijjians had played very well against Australia, their physicality and speed troubling Australia particularly early on. Wales had come off two strong performance a dismantling of Georgia before a titanic encounter with Australia left them in pole position in the group.

But it was the highly rated under dogs Fiji who started stronger, using their physicality for their first try allowing Radradda to bulldoze is way over before an incredibly well worked and planned second.

Fiji have kept the ball and worked on tightening the Wales defence.

Fiji have held the ball for a period of time. Carrying hard and moving toward the centre of the pitch. The strong clearing work has trapped to Wales defenders close to the break down and is restricting welsh width. However they decide correctly to carry for one more phase.

Wales loose five are trapped by the next carry meaning Wales are left short

While this allows the previously grounded Biggar back on to his feet, it plays a key role in preventing realignment. This is because the entire back five of the Welsh scrum have become engaged. James Davies, Moriarty and Navidii are on their feet still trapped on the wrong side of the break down. Whilst the lock pairing are competing over the ball having made a tackle. With both off their feet it means that the back row have to work hard to cover the ground.

Wales are left to scramble, as Fiji have narrowed their defence.

The strong decoy run by Botia, means that Dan Biggar is taken out of the line, and means the rest of the welsh defence have to cover on a slower angle. Meanwhile the side where the ball is are sat really narrow. This allows the ball over the top. By allowing the ball over their heads, Fiji can deploy strong runners in the 5m channel and Wales are forced to make a retreating tackle. Whilst Adams should perhaps do better, the try comes from the isolation of 5 key players and then the recognition of space on the outside coupled with a powerful finish.

However, while it was definitely a close game, Fiji fell away after the bright patches. This allowed Wales to regain there composure and finish off tries. However more importantly they were able to exploit the gaps and create opportunities.

Wales have 2 distinct lines ready to attack with Forwards and Backs still working hard, to create an opportunity

This wide angle shows the difference in the two teams level of physical fitness. While Wales have 2 distinct lines, Fiji are staggered and importantly the major gap is opposite Owen Watkin, who is carrying the ball. This means that with a strong carry he attacks the gap, and leaves Fiji struggling.

Fiji try to cover but Wales are attacking through the gaps

The double offload, first from Watkin and then Moriarty exacerbates the problem with Fiji having to commit players to the whole and unable to react to the dropped ball, expecting to tackle Wainwright. Instead Davies attacks into the space folding round and attacking just pst Moriarty. With Liam Williams next to him it creates an easy finish.

So whilst Fiji were in the contest and many welsh people were stressed and worried about the dreaded 2007 result, Wales’ fitness shone through and carried them to the line. However it should have caused some alarm to which Fiji were able to cut them open, the free flowing style similar to Wales’ quarter final opponents France.

Wales will be looking to restrict the forward momentum of France, having held Fiji to a rating of 56.3%. This however pales in insignificance to the Welsh need to keep the forward momentum high and really attack and deflate French hearts in the first 15 minutes.

The Fijiians can take heart from the performance at the World cup. They pushed both Tier One teams incredibly close whilst the defeat against Uruguay needs to be put in the context of fatigue. The overall structures and attack are there whilst the defence can hold on. The integral part to a possible for World Cup will be their fitness levels. They dropped off in both the games against Wales and Australia despite being dominant for swathes of the first half. So hopefully they can get this sorted and we see this truly global competition grow in terms of potential winners, not almost upsetters.

Wales didn’t play well but managed to ride out the Fiji storm

Scottish support secure must win bonus point against Russia

The plucky Scottish with a dazzling attack put on a masterclass The hard work put in by support runners securing the victory. Whist at the end of the day, the bonus point meant little, put out of the tournament on the Sunday by Japan, it is the style in which the bonus point was secured that Townsend and his team must take solace in.

Take a look at their first try. A simple set piece move which tears open the Russian defence as everyone succeeds in their role. By splitting the defence with two hard lines, Hastings takes the ball on the arc and eases over.

An over head view of Scotland’s first try. The set up

As you can see from this camera shot, all the Scottish players are in motion. This leads to russia becoming fractured with 1 defender shooting on to Horne whos been given the ball from the base. The simple pass out the back leaves Hastings with a wide open flank in which he can send the ball.

Hastings on the arc, can cut inside the overly aggressive scramble.

The scottish attack has held its width with 2 runners in the 15m wide channel. Whilst russia are still scrambling to cover it. This scrambling is what enables hastings to easily step inside the sweeper who has pushed over to aggressively. The line opens and he is able to easily beat the covering defender.

Having recovered the kick Scotland immediately set to attack

Then in the next example, Scotland have retrieved the ball from a kick in their 15m channel. But the response comes not from the catcher but also the ther 2 closest scots. By forming an arow head formation it enables them to stretch the defence in the most efficent way.

It is easy to expose the edge of the defence because the wider runner holds his width. This means that when the russian winger turns his shoulders inward, Scotland can expose the 5m channel.

This Front Angle shows Horne, following from the original kick

However it’s the work by George Horne that really makes the try. He immediately attacks and then continues to run in support when it may be easier to let his team finish it. The pass from his brother into the centre of the field slightly wider than the scottish 9 also prevents Russia from just pushing Scotland in field and making a side on tackle.

George Horne accelerates to get wider and give himself space

This is also prevented as Horne, changes his line attacking back towards the touchline, accelerating into a wider channel and giving his assiter enough time to make a simple and leave Horne, the finish.

These examples of support and hard work is what make scotland so exciting and effective. However, it is therefore a shock why they kicked so much ball away. They are so deadly with ball in hand and creating opportunities with well chosen angles such as the Barclay try in this game.

Scotland stats (v Ireland) are on the right,

Scotland Stats (v Japan) are on the right

Scotland kicked on average against Tier One sides 67% of their possession away. Against Japan they kept the ball in hand 27% of the time. These two stats show the underwhelming nature of the kilted warriors at this world cup. In attack stunning but sadly driven seemingly by a game plan which restricted rather than utilised their talents.

The Rugbycology rating shows just how deadly Scotland can be with ball in hand.

Argentina go out with bang, as transition takes apart USA

Argentina had a disappointing campaign compared to the success of four years ago, reaching the Semi Final and exciting everyone for the flair of outside backs away from the traditional grunt of the Pumas. The last 4 years have hardly been a cake walk, but with key results, including victories against Australia and South Africa there was a hope the ‘Pumas’ would be a world cup side.

However, things started badly for the Pumas in what was termed a knock out game against Les Bleus. This was followed by a game against England where not much happened having been in the game initially meant they met the eagles, looking to avenge a poor tournament and make amends for some poor moments.

Given the context and background to the match it is no surprise that Argentina put the eagles to the sword. However it is not the scoreline but the amazing transition and the ability to really exploit the USA that was impressive.

Argentina field kick with space and time just inside US half

Take this example from the 70th minute. A USA box kick pins Argentina in the 5m Channel, this means they are forced to spread it in-field. This allows USA to get good pressure and forces Tuculet to carry hard in the middle of the field.

Argentina have created a ruck in the middle of the park splitting the defence

As you can see the carry splits the US defence. This means that the US line tightens and Argentina are able to leave a winger in the 15m channel, this forces US to make a decision. While it is not a rapid attack that breaks the line, the carry from Tuculet is slightly angled and the ability to split the defence opens it up for Second Phase attack.

US have disjointed defence and Argentina able to go up inside

As Argentina spread the ball from the ruck they are able to isolate a tired US defence. MacGinty wants to push and stop them breaking outside. However the Number 8 on the inside is flagging meaning that MacGinty can be cut open and the Argentines get an easy opportunity which they duly converted.

However it was not just the tries, which were a positive from such a penetrating attack. The ability to convert any surprise possession to attack allowed them to make ground and pin the US back.

Kick from US is chased, however the line is staggered

The US obviously don’t help themselves, but the physical strain put on players no doubt doesn’t help. This break in 16th minute as you can see stems from a broken defensive line. It is not that one player is athead and there are two lines in cover, but that the US haven’t got a complete spread.

When most Tier 1 teams kick, they’ll have a shooter putting immediate pressure while a second line covers the rest of the pitch. In this case however, the faster Outside backs have pushed rapidly whilst the inside defence has created a stagger.

Argentina are able to break through and US lack substantial cover

This means that Argentina can break up field with the closest cover being forwards. This means that Argentina basically get free territory and if not for the superman dive from Scully they would almost certainly scored. The play instead ends with a US scrum in their own 22 having being applying pressure on Argentinas 22.

However, it was not just from kicks that Argentina were able to dismantle the US eagles. The defense forces a mistake as Macginty tries to spread the ball. The Argentine defence coming up in an umbrella forcing the US to hit a hard inside angle. A tackle from Argentina, perhaps early, forces a knock on. But whilst the US stop to either appeal the tackle or expecting the scrum, the Pumas flick a switch.

Argentina umbrella defence forces hardline, which causes knock-on

Argentina gather bouncing ball while US stop and appeal

The ball fortunately bounces into the covering Argentine’s hands. This means that he is coming with momentum able to exploit the outside edge of an already tired Eagles defence. The realisation of space and his positive movement keeps the opportunity alive.

Argentina kick in behind exploits lots of space following the US mistake

The kick in behind exposing a lack of cover from a US side, committed to attacking with phases. Luckily for the US it bounces into touch rather than Teo having to play and get out of his 5m channel. The Argentine attack caused problems like this throughout the game.

About 70% of Argentinas attacks from their own half finished in the US half. While this seems impressive, when coupled with a scoring rate of over 30% when in the US half, it shows the Pumas teeth. They were able to tear free and on almost a third of their opportunities convert to points. This game showed the depth Argentina have and it will be interesting to see how they develop. While USA had a poor tournament unable to record a win, 2019 was not about success but building and getting ready for something better. MLR is going to increase their skills exponentially, and increased interaction with Rugby they will only get better.

Rugbycology ratings show that Argentina played well, influenced by the high amount of progress they made.

SA use strong kicking game versus Canada

In this piece, I aim to show, 1) why SA were able to exploit a Canadian side who struggled to cover the back field, 2) why Canada were able to exploit SA at points, and 3) why Canada’s heart and at points, how their level of effort exposed them. While they started slowly and were put behind and beaten by half time, the second half showed promising signs as they put up a staunch resistance.

One of the main problems Canada faced early on was the inability to cover the back field. They were restricted, and SA kept them pinned back with clever kicking. However, when Canada did drop back to cover the space, it enabled SA to attack the now-uncovered 15m channel. This is clever management by SA, exposing Andrew Coe and Jeff Hassler especially. This was a perfect piece of rugby engineering to target the Opposition weakness: Jeff Hassler playing only for one season (Seattle Seawolves in the MLR has not been exposed to top Tier 1 rugby since he last played for the Ospreys two full years ago), whilst Andrew Coe has been predominantly devoted to Canada 7s in recent years, which is not at Super Rugby level.

This disparity in team levels allowed SA to prosper and take advantage of a Canadian team which had struggled throughout. But the ability to kick in behind and really control the Canadian back field enabled SA to apply pressure, manifesting itself statistically in 48% possession kicked (for reference, NZ kicked under 30% of possession against Canada).

The two instances below really show how SA exposed Canada with their kicking game.The inclusion of a second playmaker in Francis Steyn, as well as a Northern Hemisphere-based player in Cobus Reinach, allowed them to really control the game and gave them 3 comfortable kicking options with Elton Jantijies included.

South Africa steal Canadian line out ball allowing a turnover attack

This first instance comes from a turnover on a Canadian lineout ball. The South African ability to steal the ball is not surprising, but the adaptability and play immediately following this turnover is key. Schalk Brits receives the ball and shifts it out to Jantijies, who in turn quickly passes to a flat Steyn. With SA flat, having been prepared to defend, Steyn kicks in behind.

The space created by the turnover is exposed by Steyn as he kicks cross field

With only two players covering the back field – having expected to keep possession – Canada are exposed.

The Canadians were also exposed from another mistake allowing SA to use a pendulum kick. Having boxed kick and winning the ball back, they kick across to the other side of the field, exposing a tightened defence.

Snyman regains a misfielded kick from Canada and carries dominantly through Canadian lines.

Snyman reclaims the ball after Canada are unable to diffuse the box kick from the Springboks. The short carry from Snyman with a small offload allows SA to attack and gain momentum while Canada automatically scramble. The drawing in of multiple Canadians allows the kick from Steyn moments later.

The back field is left uncovered due to the pace of SA’s transition

Perhaps the Canadians had been expecting SA to attack. However, due to the lack of options Steyn kicks in behind into an undefended right wing, exposing a Canadian back field with only one player. The kick runs just enough for Nelson to cut it off behind his line and gain Canada a 22. And while the kick is not on a highlights reel, it reveals a key tactic for SA.

To some degree, the game was used by Rassie Erasmus as a dress rehearsal for SA’s Quarter Final, practicing strategies, as well as testing his reserve squad. In this regard, the game was a great exhibition: Reinach’s hat-trick, showing Erasmus he should have no worries at Scrum Half, whilst Steyn and Jantjies are more than comfortable deputies. Meanwhile, Canada may harbour some worries, the loss of their lineout and missing a kick to give SA a great platform and strong scoring ability against them.

However, Canada can be pleased with how they were able to stem the flow in the second half. The game illustrates the Canadian weakness in moving forward with only a forward momentum of 18.4%, compared to a score of 42% against NZ. No doubt this was a major plus for the Bokke defence. In the future, Canada will want to rebuild and begin to really tighten up defensively and be much more dynamic in attack.