In a second blog post on Ireland’s first try, I’ll examine in brief the 3 stages that led to the try. Having built pressure on the phase attack prior, Ireland were camped in the Welsh half. This particular attack begins in the Welsh 22, the second in a row after a poor exit by Biggar.
In an unusual set up, Ireland called an 8+1 Lineout commiting 9 players. However this has the benefit of allowing lots of moving parts and giving them front foot ball despite the best attempts of Tipuric and Ken Owens. Placing Connor Murray at the tail may seem an odd choice, especially as it places him further away from the next ruck. However, as usual it’s a precalled move so every player knows their role. The move from Murray away therefore has positive impacts despite seemingly erraticness, especially seen as he can’t get the ball.
By pulling round the front, he creates a slight delay in the line, as Wales have to worry about a front peel, a maul or the tail attack. By screening the play with Van der Flier positioned at the back of the maul, Wales can’t adapt quickly enough and Aki makes the gainline on the tip from Herring. At which point Murray then crosses back through the weshline, having maybe only a slight hole but highlighting a gap in between Ball and Wainwright who pushes round the corner rapidly.
Ireland then continued with a close pick and go game. This final example before Lamour’s try categorises, their tactics in the contact. From the previous phase we can see that both Alun Wyn Jones and Aaron Wainwright have been pinned, whilst on the active carry Ireland use an early latch and a late one to add ballast to the carry. By using Cian Healy from the outset on the base of the ruck, the Irish carrier is automatically pushed wider. This brings in 3 welsh defenders. Whilst Justin Tipuric is non-commital, his mere narrowing means he defends the fringe on the next phase and stops Owens working naturally to assess the options.
However the problem doesn’t stem from Tipurics non-committal, instead, Jake Ball and Wyn Jones have become focussed on the breakdown. The efficiency of the carries, with the gainline breached on almost every phase has caused wales to back track significantly. This means Ball has twisted inward and now is having to guard the fringes. As well as this, Wyn Jones has followed the lock inward, creating the crumbling foundations which Ireland expose.
At first glance, the armour try comes from a poor defensive tackle by Tompkins who has clearly over pushed. However, there is much more than this, that causes the play to succeed. Yet again, Ireland manages to have multiple pieces in motion and while certainly not as equiste as the Sexton try against Scotland there is beauty in the moving of multiple pieces.
However, this beauty is hard to understand with a tight angle. Instead let us consider the try from behind the posts.
As you’ll see at the beginning of the clip you’ll see Tompkins alerting Wainwright to a threat on Larmours inside. This causal inside arc is intended so that two things are possible. By moving fast, Ireland can get set quickly into their 1-2-2-3 structure. It also obviously has pulled wales apart. Wainwright concerning himself with the insight line holds his feet and is slightly checked by the Irish player. Of course, Tompkins has over accelerated in haste to get to Conway, but these little details stop an effective scramble and prevent Wales hauling down the Irish full back.
Overall, whilst a poor game for Wales, there were bright sparks. However, the credit lies with Ireland. They are settling into a new system, and despite some of the ease they found against some mistakes, they took their opportunities well. As the Irish prepare to descend on Twickenham, I for one can’t wait to see the next innovation in Farrell’s system.
If you’d like to read a longer analysis on this try and the system Ireland are developing then click below
Ireland will descend on London in good spirits, having beaten Wales with their new system beginning to be more fruitful. Momentum is key in a tournament like the Six Nations, and having started with 2 wins they can rightfully feel a little bit more confident. As well as this, we are beginning to see trends in their game plan. Wales on the other hand, looked at points disjointed (mainly in defence) in a way I, having lived only through the Gatland era, have only seen sporadically. The attack was flowing well, but often they were their own worst enemies, unable to exert major pressure on Ireland starting 44 of 56 attacks in their own half, 20 in their Own 22. When Ireland turned the screw they broke Wales. Not to say Wales were outclassed enough to deserve nothing from the game.
Now with the context of the game set, and my incredibly brief summary written, it’s time to delve into how Ireland exploited this defence. By examining Larmours try we see a pattern develop. But it begins 5 or so minutes earlier, with an Ireland penalty in their own half.
Ireland start at a midfield 4 man line out
Having kicked to touch Ireland set a 4 man line out. Conor Murray sits close to the 5m channel meaning that he can come running onto the ball off the top. Wales, in response, have Tomos Williams sat in the 5m Channel and Ken Owens at tail gunner. Ireland then play a simple crash ball with Aki playing straight from 9 allowing extra speed, as they don’t have to use an extra pair of hands which could slow down the attack.
At the following ruck CJ Stander is immediately there to cover the ball. Stander also then pins in Justin Tipuric, who plays a key role in the welsh defence. Wales however have defended the crash ball well, Biggar the target of the Aki has been helped well by Tipuric and can be seen realigning while the Welsh defence has immediately set up with Owens at guards allowing a smooth transition, from Lineout defense to phase play.
Wales then defended well again in the outside channels. The midfield partnership combines well to shut off Irish options, however despite a good read by the Tompkins he is dismissed too easily and Faletau has to tidy up and put Henshaw to the floor. This forces Wales’ already tighter line to focus on the ball. If you look at the wide shots, you’ll see Wales have already left an overlap, which whilst well defended shows why Ireland found ground later.
Ireland switch and settle in to formation
Then immediately following finding the 15m channel, Ireland pivot and crash using a pod of 3 to try and tighten the Wales defence. With a strong tackle Alun Wyn Jones and Jake Ball put the runner to ground, but Ireland have now involved all bar one of the Welsh loose 5 (4,5,6,7,8) with only Wainwright not making a tackle. This was a trend throughout with a high amount of carries aimed down the loose 5s main channels. The pass here from Murray allows Ireland to attack the wider defenders, and crucially allows them momentum meaning the carry forces Wales backward.
Then Ireland spin the ball a little wider with Aki yet again forcing a tackle from Biggar. This time aided by Wyn Jones, Biggar loses the collision and Ireland have a good platform set.
Now having let the play develop Ireland have played 2 complete sequences and have hit phase 6. Yet again having reached the 15m the Irish use a pod of 3 forwards. Cian Healy this time hits receives the ball from Murray, but much like he did against Scotland turns and plays to a player on the loop. Henshaw then crashes and wins the collision. The dominance in the collision and subsequent ground comes from the system Ireland are using. By playing with a 1-3-2-2, as Brett Igoe pointed out, they can use the pod to fix welsh players, while using faster attackers on subsequent phases. On this occasion the ball doesn’t go wide instead the 2 formed just to the right of the pod (see below) form the clearing committee for the ruck.
Irelands new 1-3-2-2 (the groups are interchangeable) with the other 2 engaged on the previous phase
The beauty of this structure, is Ireland’s ability to offer multiple options whilst also speading these options right across the park. As we’ve seen they play the ball out the back of this 3 man pod. However, this has forced a slight defensive error from Wales, as Tipuric circled in red has jumped from the line early, in a similar fashion to Wales’ scrum halves.
This early jump from Tipuric enables Ireland to find the shoulder of the openside and crucially force a weak tackle in the channel between Tipuric and Wyn Jones, the welsh loosehead. By forcing the weak tackle it means that Ireland are immediately on the front foot and can spread the ball wider.
The ball is then spread wide from the follow on ruck, with Ireland having offloaded and got Wales moving backward. This has 2 crucial parts in how Ireland can find the width so effectively. Firstly they don’t waste time hitting every man in the line. Instead Murray floats a tempting pass across Ryan and onto stockdale carving a wider line. This forces North to miss the ball and be out paced on the outside. Secondly, Ireland have stacked options with their flowing structure. Josh Van der Flier, (Circled in Yellow above), adorned in a red scrum hat has held the width. This means Biggar is having to defend a 3 on 1 in the wide channels. Whilst they do lose the ball, they then have a wider defence, meaning they then resteal the ball and win the penalty.
Sadly, this lovely bit of phase play doesn’t lead directly to a try even from the subsequent the lineout. As wales are able to envelope a maul and win a scrum. Instead we have to wait till the lineout following the Welsh exit.
The poor kick from Biggar, allows Ireland to start an attack in the Welsh 22. This time a bit further out but still in the strike zone which maintains pressure on the welsh line.
Ireland start with an 8+1 (Murray and Stockdale in the Lineout with JVDF at 9)
Having previously used a maul to start in the Welsh 22, again Ireland creat a swarm around the jumper, which drags the welsh forwards together. This is especially clear as both Faletau and Dillon Lewis angle their shoulders inwards. With Ken Owens, et again defending from the tail also gazing slightly towards the mass of bodies. From this situation, Herring is able to collect a sneaky ball from Van der Flier and combine with Aki to find the hinge point of the lineout (the place between the original lineout defense and the offside line for people not involved). Again Tipuric is forced to make a tackle positioned inside biggar to protect the Fly Half.
This move has many moving parts, which help to generate a stable source of possession in the Welsh 22. Stockdale, having been positioned at the front of the lineout loops round and helps drive through the ruck and provide ball for the forwards. Following a set plan, ireland the begin a series of carries focussing on the detail to develop momentum.
Ireland work with multiple carriers, hitting the edge of defenders and forcing double tackles. The welsh defence also begins to struggle, with tacklers often pinned under bodies. In the example above, O’Mahony has pinned Dillon Lewis on the floor with Jake Ball still getting up from his previous excursions. This means that Wales are left shorter on the openside, contributing to a lack of width in defence, with Josh Adams like North in the previous version stuck before the 15m Line.
Having changed direction in the shadow of the posts, Ireland have had 3 key impacts. The welsh backrow, normally spread across the pitch have been forced to help close to the tryline. They also have kept opponents pinned down with strong latched carries. This has the final and key effect on the guard defenders. The welsh fringe, have eyes only for the ball. Jake Ball and Wyn Jones are gazing inward while Wainwright acrobatically regains his feet ready to try and cover the threat that is imminent.
A top angle view as Larmour scores the first try.
This threat is realised by the Irish, who are able to exploit it through Larmour and bundle over. As you can see though, Wales lack any real width. Tompkins is in at the third guard with Wainwright only gaining his feet as Murray takes his passing stride. The pass from murray is supreme and finds the edge of an inwardly glancing Tompkins. Tompkins then makes a slight second mistake coming from a positive action. As Wainwright arrives inside him Tompkins points out the threat of Sexton running an inside arc on Larmour. This while good communication and incredibly positive to see has an effect on Tompkins next action.
He over trust the inside man. Whilst in rugby it is common place to trust your inside man and enable you to push, Tompkins does this in a slightly panicked state as Larmour fades onto the wide pass. This means rather than previously where Wales had let Larmour exhaust his options and not make a real opportunity Tompkins leaves his inside open, trusting Wainwright to cover.
This slight over drift is the result of compounded errors, with Ball and Wyn Jones looking inward they don’t set proper spacing with very few options targeting that 2m channel either side of the ruck. This allows Ireland to strike on the outside of the Tompkins who has done everything right, and trusts his inside man, hoping the inside defence will push. In the heat of battle he over accelerates and Larmour takes a well finished try.
Overall, for Wales this will be a disappointing try to concede. This comes from slight individual errors having a large effect. However, these are easy fixes, so rather than this being a negative for Wales, it should instead be viewed as a positive for Ireland. Their new system helped them gain ground and territory against an admittedly narrow defence. From here, they keep the pressure on and are able to execute superbly with a wonderful pass and beautiful line. With the system now bedded in, and momentum under a new coach Ireland are prospering, leaving an entertaining match in Twickenham.
While the majority of English gazed forlornly at the worsening situation in Paris, fans at Sandy Park were treated to a high scoring if one sided game. In the semi-final Harlequins defeated Exeter 49 points to 22. Interestingly the victors were helped by an as yet uncapped number 8 in Alex Dombrandt who grabbed 2 tries. However, it was not only his performance, managing to score those two tries but the Harlequins system which delivered the first that I want to focus on.
For the first try, Harlequins started from a lineout in the 22nd Minute, just inside the Chiefs 22. The Lineout is a 7 man lineout, however Dombrandt is positioned at Scrum Half, with Danny Care instead marking the front of the Lineout. This means that Dombrandt can immediately receive the ball from the pod as they form a fake maul.
By playing from this position Exeter are forced to make a decision with their front pod having to engage and their back pod having to hold the line waiting for Dombrandt to decide. By allowing Dombrandt to make the decision Harlequins immediately gain the initiative.
This effect is then increased as the Harlequins runners have an incredibly visible trigger to start from. Rather than having to rely on Dombrandt passing at the right time, they can be in motion as soon as the ball comes out. Normally this would result in staggered running and slow the attack, as they become indecisive while the defence can see the entire play.
However the stagnating is avoided as a result of two things. Firstly, Lasike pick a line hitting the hinge defender positioned third from the maul. By hitting his outside shoulder he profits from his in decision. This is also helped by Ross Chisholm running on a line closer to the maul. By both targeting the same defender, they can exploit the gap made by the offside line. Because the Exter defence have to be 10m back from the lineout, Harlequins have split second advantage to attack from as they know their role while Exeter are having to react to the situation.
This situation is then helped due to how Exeter have chosen to defend. As is traditional they have lined their spare back row inside the 10 deal with the crash ball. However this also means he is ever so slightly slower. This is then helped by the tail defender pushing aggressively for Chisholm and then adapting late when Lasike cuts underneath him. This uncoordinated defence helps to unbalance the defence and allows Quins to make additional yardage.
The effect of the strong carry by Lasike is then seen on the next phase. Having been dominant in the tackle Lasike has allowed Dombrandt to do his role and set his shape early. As Harlequins have also deployed two options this is key. With Dombrandt’s inside player fixing two defenders, with Exeter employing a double tackle tactic it allows Dmobrandt to hit the outside shoulder. This means that Dombrandt dominates the tackle and Harlequins only face a small drop in momentum.
Harlequins as before are also to set their shape early, with a pod of 2 carriers and a protector ready immediately for Danny Care. The latched carry is important due to Exeter’s use of the double tackle, as it enables an equal confrontation and Harlequins are able make ground again from the carry. The protector then is able to easily step over the ruck and prevent any counter drives . As well as this it means Santaigo Garcia Botta can drive past the ruck, slowing Exters fold. This is integral merely because it allows Harlequins to prevent the Chiefs line speed which had on the previous phases prevented some momentum from the carries being developed.
The next part of Harlequins structure that brings success is shown on the final phase. With Heron sitting deep they are able exploit the Chiefs lack of numbers, as they are unable to fill the entire pitch. Marcus smith receives the ball and has 3 clear options, with a short ball to Dombrandt on the inside, Morris running a tip line and Herron out the back. By having a 2 playmaker model, caused admittedly by injury, Harlequins are able to spread their attacking threat, while Herron also understands his role in offering an option. This paired with fast hands enables him to put Ibitoye away.
However it is not merely the ability to free Ibitoye on the outside that matters, but instead Dombrandt’s alertness to the passage of play.
Dombrandt has come from running an inside line on Smith and has ended up just inside the 15m line ready to react for the next phase. This well oiled play was intended to isolate Chiefs in the wide channels and with Ibitoye receiving the ball dombrandt is able to run a ‘’cheat’’ line.
Overall this play has delivered Harlequins an opportunity they can score from due to 3 key aspects of their set up.
Firstly, the fake maul at the very start enabled Quins to attack when they wanted to and expose the tail of the lineout, where Exeter were guilty of leaving Lasike unmarked.
Secondly, the ability to win the collision whether through tip balls or latched carries. This helps to develop the momentum and allows them to set their shape early.
Thirdly, by following a preset plan of attack, with a specific target they know their roles. This allows them to find a specific edge of Chiefs and exploit the weakness identified and create an opportunity. After all, you have to be there to score them.
In Rugby ATL’s first game as an MLR side, admittedly pre season, they tasted victory against long-standing MLR team NOLA Gold. They played well to break down NOLA and especially well to hold on. For a first true outing, despite the slightly odd structure of 40-20-40 minute thirds, they were very composed and exploited NOLA very well.
Rugby ATL played a very expansive game, with lots of variation. This resulted in 60% progression rate, over 20% more than NOLA. However, while this ability to escape each zone (broken down by Own 22, Own 50, Opp 50 and Opp 22) is crucial it is the transition for their first try I want to focus on.
1st Phase turnover allows Atlanta to build an attack
Atlanta’s initial possession begins from a turnover. The disorganized nature of defence caused by the turnover allows Atlanta to immediately create momentum. Because of the interception happening rather fortuitously in between the lineout and the NOLA Gold backline it means that the extra defenders for NOLA have to wrap behind the ruck and can’t immediately cover the wing. This happens while the Atlanta team can wrap round and prepare a second phase attack.
Atlanta attack the width pulling NOLA with them
As pointed out above, the NOLA defenders covering from the right wing are covering more ground allowing Atlanta to cover the width of the field and reach the edge of NOLAs defence with ease. As well as this Atlanta use a forward as a dummy short option close to the break down. This again helps to split the line while also forcing a deceleration in the outside defenders worried about their inside man.
Atlanta have played 2 phases and now settle into a 1-3-3-1 structure
Having reached the edge, Atlanta can settle in to their preferred structure, 1-3-3-1. The 1-3-3-1 refers to the positioning of the forwards on the pitch. With two central pods of 3, it allows multiple option when their running. However, crucially as in the clip above, the 2 additional forwards will clear the ruck allowing quick ball.
Again Atlanta play within the structure
Again with 3 forwards carrying hard Atlanta play off 9. A strong NOLA tackle stops them, but Atlanta continue to work round the corner. The key part of this 1-3-3-1 structre is that the ball is quick, and that the carries generate at least partial momentum as they have done so far for Atlanta.
Atlanta find the width and attack with speed to expose the holes against an unadjusted NOLA defence
This momentum then pays dividends as Atlanta again reach the edge of the NOLA defence. With the hard carries previously putting NOLA on the back foot, Rugby ATL slow the line speed allowing the hole on the right to be exposed.
However, despite not scoring, it sets the final phase. They have stopped NOLA wrapping and as such have created the easy opportunity.
Atlanta generate quick ball and form a full field threat
The speed of the ball of these final two phases has to remarkable effects both on attack and defence. Looking to the right, we can still see one of the NOLA defenders retreating. This shows the true pace and speed of the ruck. The second effect, while not having an impact on the play helps show Atlanta’s intent and why their going to be a threat this season. The speed of the ball has allowed them to set an attack on both sides. As a result, Atlanta manage to expose NOLA on the blindside but using their intensity would have been more than comfortable attacking the openside.
This brilliant try shows 2 key things for attack in rugby. The ability to transition and the importance of quick ball. Rugby Atlanta maybe a new franchise but their ability to transition for this try and generate quick ball while staying in their structure was remarkable. I for one, can’t wait to see how this expansion team can improve and challenge the already established teams.
Exeter were the ones who came away with the points in the clash between English Rugby’s new titans. Saracens rightly or wrongly the champions and kings in England defeated, admittedly at home, and unsettled by an Exter team who defended doggedly and survived vindicating their position as leaders with their title credentials surviving a serious test.
But while Exeter won the game how much of a case was it that Saracens were off the boil and how did they find an advantage against the Chiefs suffocating defence?
Using 3 examples from the First Half we can clearly see Saracens being rattled and out of sorts, before the final charge which was almost rewarded but for the desperate and outstanding work of Joe Simmonds.
Saracens start an attack from a line out and aim at the hinge between the line out and defensive line.
The first example begins in the 22nd minute. Saracens are attacking from a lineout and look to play a set pattern. First they throw to the tail of the lineout, slightly crossing the 15m, allowing Spencer to come running onto the ball and kick start the motion of the backline. Barrit receives the ball attacking directly at the joint between the lineout and the Exter defensive line. From this position Saracens can get quick ball. While allowing their forwards to know their jobs and follow a strict plan. Mako Vuinopola is able to move directly from the tail to the ruck rather than having to predict where he needs to be.
This pattern is also reinforced by his brother Billy. Having run alongside Taylor he can realign allowing the full 2 phase play to be completed. Billy carries allowing Saracens to reach the centre of the field of two strong carries. However, it is when they switch that they become confused and seem to lose their way.
Farrell doesn’t sit in the pocket behind Skelton as expected in Saracens traditional pods system
Rather than setting up their traditional pod structure with Farrell hidden behind there is a disconnect unusual to Saracens. This has been caused by 2 things. Firstly, they haven’t made as much ground as they would have wanted from the lineout. This means they have been unable to really gain momentum for their attack. This effect has then worsened because of how Exeter have defended. By placing 2 men in the ruck they have slowed it down significantly which allows the rest of the defense to fill the field. This means that Spencer is indecisive and has to switch back into the midfield a phase early. The problem manifesting itself in a ripple effect causing a stuttering attack.
Farrell is still organising the next phase instead of sitting in the pocket behind Skelton and George
The stutter is clear once you play the clip forward. While Farrell would normally be tight to the screen he’s now set further back. Had he placed himself in the blue circle he would then have been able to open up the sarries attack and identify the issues. However, he instead is found to be marshalling the next move rather than committing to his role under the situation.
This could have been a strong play by saracens and really opened up Exeter, instead it just ends in a total loss of momentum and a poor attack. The reason it could have been so strong lies in 3 things. Exeter have 3 defenders (Yellow Line) grouped ready to hit the pod and deliver immediate pressure. With Farrell too deep, all they have to focus on is Skelton and can easily perform another double tackle to stunt the momentum once again. However, had Farrell been tighter he could well have used the Saracens player on his shoulder. By targeting the space between the third and fourth defender he can pull exter to a more passive defence. This would have two effects depending on how Exeter react. Either Exeter will go man on man and the third defender on the Yellow line will turn to deal with this next threat or they continue with the current picture and aim to take Skelton ball and all.
This means Farrel by dropping deeper has allowed Saracens to be matched up and smashed rather than bringing it to a choice on the third defender. This continues the problem with their stuttering attack and has resulted in a poor attacking set.
The second example of their struggles with the ball comes from the 31st minute and particularly of their kick returns. Exter and Saracens both kicked 20+ times throughout the match meaning that a good kick return was crucial. However, Saracens were often caught narrow and unable to expose Exeter despite some oppurtunities.
Exeter have a double line defence with Woodburn shooting to hit Malins
Here Exeter have made a good kick chase with Olly Woodburn shooting to hit Malins while the rest form a wall. The strength of the chase comes from two things, the kick has isolated with Malins relying on a screen of Saracens players just to gather the ball. This screen has slowed Woodburn enough for Malins to gain possession but he’s immediately forced to take passive action falling at Woodburn’s feet rather than trying to break the Exeter line and gain ground. Secondly the chase relies on Woodburn being able to quickly close that space. Had Woodburn been caught languishing or stopped by the screen then Malins would have been able to counter attack. This individual moment then has massive ramifications for the rest of the attack.
Saracens lack width during the attack from the second phase
As you can see in the image above, Saracens in the midst of their second phase with Billy Vuinopola carrying off 9. However, the carry is ineffective with the problem stemming from Woodburn’s work on the previous phase. Vuinopola is unable to break the gainline, drawn in pink, and as such it continues the backward movement of Saracens.
However, it is not the carry being hit behind the gainline that is the major problem. The lack of width should be a real worry for Saracens. The widest player is Brad Barrit, who himself is not spreading beyond the midpoint of the half. This is a truly limiting factor coming from Woodburn’s exploits. Daly (Blue Circle) should be Saracens widest player, however he had come to counter attack from the kick and offer a second playmaker option. Instead because of Woodburn’s immediate impact Daly is now forced to realign after the second phase having been forced into offering an alternative option. This completely restricts Saracens and means they are forced to run against a well organised defence. Yet again the attack ends with very little gain and Owen Farrell kicks the ball away.
However in the 32nd minute Saracens exhibit what they can do when they get width immediately. Whilst the attack comes from a turnover the premise is still the same, try and stretch the defence and attack the fringe.
Saracens fill the pitch off a turnover and attack the edge of the pitch
Having the ball come from turnover means Exeter are not immediately organised and ready to defend. This allows Farrell to spread the ball immediately to Daly who had been covering the backfield. This added depth enables Saracens stretch the play and are not constricted by the Exeter defence. As well as this Sarries have no filled the pitch from one touchline to the 15m line. The effective attacks is still central but there is significantly more ground for Exter to cover.
Daly exposes Devoto’s aggressive defence attacking the inside
As Exeter have to cover more ground they operate a drift defense aiming to push Saracens to the width. However they become disconnected. As you can see one Chiefs player has shot up with his hips pointing aggressively forward and across while inside he has 2 tight forwards who pulling inside to cover the space. This therefore is a clear issue with the shooter trying to close the space and push Daly, while on his inside they are allowing Daly to pull them conceding ground but narrowing Daly’s options. Daly then recognises the space and is able to kick through the space. This is helped by the work of Wray who offers a blocking line on the Exeter forwards.
Overall the above attack results in significant ground gained from Devoto pushing to aggressively and exposing the inside. From here, Saracens are able to gain momentum and really test Exeter for the first major time.
Farrell sits behind the screen ready to spread play
Having made the break and then offloaded Daly sits in the 15m Channel forcing Exter to put numbers there, however with Saracens now on the front foot Farrell now sits behind his pod. Where as previously the Chiefs had matched the numbers now they have 3 fringe defenders including a guard who have to focus on the close runners. This means Farrell considers himself open and is able to use more of the field.
Saracens have multiple options ready to spread the play
While the pass is poor due to the double tackle from Exeter, Saracens are then running again at a mismatched defence. The impressive transition from unstructured individualism from Daly to the pods and structured running lines means Farrell can now guide the attack with ease. While yet again this attack ends with a kick, it shows 2 things. How Saracens were able to pick apart the Chiefs with an impeccable transition and the importance of the first tackle in stopping Saracens.
Finally I want to examine the precursor to the key moment of the first half. Saracens receive the ball from a long kick and attack using all their skills to win a penalty before that maul and Joe SImmonds moment of brilliance. However, while yet again the final result went in Chiefs favour it was Saracens who looked liked they had finally clicked.
Exeter’s chase doesn’t apply enough pressure and leaves space for Farrell
From the kick Saracens receive the ball on their own 10 metre line. With Farrell taking the ball from Malins and finding the edge of the shortened kick chase from Exeter. By breaking this first line Saracens immediately gain the momentum. Farrell then offloads to Duncan Taylor dragging Saracens forward again until they have progressed up to the Exeter 10m line. While this may seem of very little importance it enables Saracens to shift straight into shape rather than build phases and momentum.
Exeter’s defence is disjointed allowing Skelton linebreak
From Taylors carry Saracens begin to set up their structure. Exeter however, are yet again victim to a poorly organized defense which is disjointed. With Saracens on the edge of the 15m channel Exeter would traditionally operate a rush defence. This is because they can aim to shut off the Saracens attack. However, the inside fringe defenders having just come from a kick chase aim to push across the field with a passive defence. This, as shown by the black arrows, causes a massive array of slightly different movements in the Exter defense. This allows Skelton to run off the shoulder of Vunipola and make a break simply from a slightly disjointed defence.
This results in Saracen then being able to play wide and reaching the edge of Exeter with ease.
Exeter are exposed outside and have to concede ground
As you can see, having reached the edge Saracens have used the full width and can just run straight to eat up ground against a passive defensive. With this strong platform and easy ground Exeter end up having to kill the ball on the ground and attempt to stop any more advances. As a result Saracens get a penalty which they can kick to the corner.
So while Exter did survive, this showed how deadly Saracens can be with the ball, especially once they can go wide. However Saracens appeared in this game to rely on a cliche passed around at the grassroots level to the pro level. They were forced to earn the right to go wide against a suffocating defence. This really was the root of Saracens struggle. Instead of being able to dictate against Chiefs they instead were forced to create their own momentum something which more often than not came from Chiefs errors than individual brilliance.
In this clash of titans Exeter came through credentials intact while Saracens broke down in parts unable to settle into their normal formations and then convert when they had the momentum. While it was no classic the game has shown the key of first phase momentum and the ability to settle into your traditional shape in winning games.
Gloucester secured victory on a wet night in the west of England helped by the indisplince of the warriors and the fast feet and superb finishing of Louis Rees Zammit. Worcester suffered a yellow card to Ryan Mills in the second half opening up a previously solid if under pressure defence. However, while the game will be remembered for Zammit’s finishing and his assist for a try of the season contender, it is worth bearing in remind Gloucester’s poor performance in the Worcester 22.
Whilst gloucester ended with a conversion rate of 2.2 points per start. While it meant they left with 29 points overall a strong absolute figure, the conversion rate sat below that from the Worcester 50 and given the amount of pressure exerted, they should have left with significantly more points. By Half time, Gloucester had managed a strong 5 starts in the Worcester 22. With only one scoring play, and a misley penalty at that it showed how Gloucester really did struggle until the yellow card broke the Warriors resistance.
But why did the cherry and Whites struggle and what simple changes can be made to allow a true challenge for the top 4. However, we will start by analysing their defence, showing why both Worcester and Gloucester struggled to convert priceless field position.
In the example below, it’s easy to see how Gloucester used a strangling defence and restricted the Worcester attack. Worcester worked side to side but simply failed to breach the Gloucester defense. Worcester were able to move side to side, but strong defence, and simple breakdown work prevented any real momentum.
Having started from a line out at the blue line, Worcester make ground up into the Gloucester 22. However, from here, they start their attacks too deeply and are unable to make continuous ground. This is for a variety of reasons. Look in the image Worcester only have two serious running threats coming off the first receiver. This means that Gloucester can easily mark both of them, especially as they are running at different men. As well as this, it is tighthead Schonert receiving the ball, who decides to carry despite lacking momentum. They are not able to recycle the quick ball needed to test defenses the initial opportunity been spurned and now Worcester have to look to restart their attack. From here they get pushed back and back really struggling to break the oppressive Gloucester wall.
As part of the same attack Worcester are now pushed all the way back to the 22 line. As well as this Gloucester are comfortable and able to jackal and slow the ball down stopping Worcester gaining any advantageous possession and restarting the attack.
Then having realigned Gloucester are able to push the Warriors back again. Zammit is key here getting in the eye line and preventing Worcester exposing the space in the wide channels. While it may seem that I have strayed from my initial point, everything in rugby is connected and the Gloucester defence is what allows them to lay a firm foundation however their attack is beset by the same problems as Worcester. In this phase of play, Worcester played in the 15m channel once apart from the original lineout. Not reaching the edge of their attacking line on any occasion.
While a switch play can help to surprise defenses and can allow momentum to be gathered. The pendulum like attack became predictable from Worcester and allowed Gloucester to consistently win the battle of the gainline. The art of the switch is to expose defenders getting up from a break down and attack weak shoulders. However the constant switching meant that the Gloucester defence were able to tighten and their forwards, crucially Mostert, Ludlow and Ackerman centralise and hit rucks and make big tackles.
However, while they were delivering the tackles here, Gloucester reverted to almost exactly the same attack when they got to the Worcester 22. The defense example outlined above resulted in a scrum which resulted in a lineout on the Worcester 22, an example we will now examine.
Gloucester have won an opportunity for themselves, however, they seemed to lack *composure* chucking the ball wide and allowing Worcester to rush them immediately. This poor pass from Morgan means that Gloucester are unable to generate front foot ball immediately. This results in the opportunity being wasted.
Trying to attack in the width Gloucester leave with no points and spurn the opportunity. However, luckily for Ackerman’s men this wasn’t the entire story of their evening following the first Worcester yellow card.
Let’s examine Ruan Ackermans try and how Gloucester were able to finally open space and build a scoring attack. Firstly, Gloucester hit a crash ball. Now a man to the good Gloucester hit the ball immediately up through Atkinson.
Despite scrappy ball, Gloucester are still able to drive. Then they flood the channel near the ruck and keep carrying hard. Working the ball to the 15m before pivoting quickly not allowing the reset of the Worcester defence.
The difference in the 2 sides attacks are simple, and explain what is key to this confrontational play.
While Gloucester start the attack in the 22m and following a negative carry (one not gaining momentum) they manage to restart with simple carries and hitting the shoulders of defenders. However Worcester struggled and use single runners at strong tackles, causing them to lose ground.
Gloucester were stopped the spreading and of Worcester by keeping the carries close to the ruck. While Worcester continued to lose ground, they covered the width in 2 or 3 passes whilst the Cherry and Whites struck with continuous tight carries. This stopped the forwards being able to defend specific channels. It also meant that they had to tighten.
Overall it was these 2 differences that meant Gloucester managed to score despite no initial momentum. Striking close rather than allowing rest periods for the defence and the use of latches and multiple options was the difference. No doubt helped by the yellow card, Gloucester did eventually pull away.
However, given this was against 14 men there will undoubtedly need to be improvements. Crucially this must start with an increase in variation. There was a clear mindset change from the border of Worcester 22. While in 50m areas Gloucester had over 200% variation, recording 260% in their own half and 286% in the Worcester half. However, this dropped to 117.4% in the Worcester 22m. These may seem like just numbers, however when applied to the context of a comparison of the entire game and the first half.
Gloucesters attack play breakdown, entire gameGloucesters attack breakdown 1st Half
Gloucester recorded only 50% variation in the Worcester 22. Less than half that of the whole game score. This was coupled with no wide plays, meaning they rarely stretched the defence, falling into the same trap as Worcester.
If Gloucester, can change this picture and start to stretch defences more than they can truly be a threat for any team.
In the fourth round of European Action, Ulster travelled to Harlequins knowing that whilst they had been a strong team in the pool they had missed out on opportunities. The game against Clermont in the Second Rounds had left them without a winning bonus point and it was the same at home against Harlequins in Round 3. For Harlequins, it had been a disappointing European campaign reflected, in the appearance of Marcus Smith in the coaches box rather than on the wet turf below. This had not to say, that Quins had left all their first choice team out with Sinckler returning for his first appearance at home since an almost perfect World Cup campaign. This set the scene for a scratchy, tense and tactical affair in front of the Harlequins crowds and under London clouds.
As you can probably tell from the introduction above, the weather played a large part in the game. It was the rain which led to a largely tactical affair. This was reflected in the stats as you can expect. Ulster kicked the most, managing to pin Harlequins back with a kicking rate of 84.6% while Harlequins kicked at an average of 60.7%. These high numbers set the background. However it was the still the grind of long general phases of play which set the background.
The breakdown of styles. Ulster (black) kicked a lot more, while Quins attempted more runs in a game dominated by the weather.
Ulster, basing their game around economy really aimed to stretch Harlequins, when they did have the ball, take this example in the 29th minute. For context, the play has started from a Landajo box kick gathered on the Harlequins 10m by Ulster’s John Cooney.
Ulster immediately, play 2 phases down the middle setting a solid platform before, stretching Quins and playing the full width reaching Faddes in the outside channel. This has the benefit of pulling Harlequins and forcing some extra effort as some over pull and have to reassemble. This causes a contraction in the Quins lineup close to the break down.
Following this Ulster then play 2 balls yet again reaching into the centre of the field.
From the second breakdown they play wide, Burns pulling the ball deep and exposing the outside of Ismaiel. Interestingly Harlequins were deploying Dombrandt deeper to cover the kicks meaning they had once less forward in the line. However, once the break is made Ulster aim to reset and deliberately tighten the play.
This allows them to keep the ball, even despite a slight break from the pattern with the offload. By slowing down the attack following the break Ulster were able to retain possession. While on this occasion it didn’t lead to a try it shows the deliberate nature of Ulster, which whilst boring was effective in exerting pressure.
This is in comparison with Quins, who often struggle to continue the opportunities they created.
Take this example from a minute or so after the above period of Ulster pressure. Harlequins have gotten into Ulster territory and strart from a Lineout. The crash ball however, is aimed at Marcell Coeteze who sits back the runner and kills momentum. James Lang, then does make ground on the following carry. But Quins are then drawn into playing in front of the gain line.
Cavubati in the exmaple above runs a strong line forcing two defenders in, with a nice flick inside allowing Elia to carry late at Herring. However, the ball comes early and Cavubati is shaping to pass before he has interested Ulster. This means Elia gets caught. While Ulster were no by means perfect at breaching the gainline on every carry, Cavubati’s carry kills momentum completely after Lang had given it a boost.
This leads to the example above, where Chisholm and Goneva look to challenge the central defenders. However, Chisholm receives the ball to deep. Not only does this limit the possible ground gained, it also means the forwards on the tip can be cut off completely naturally. Chisholm sees, not only a white wall, but a river of defenders. This is a simple effect of Rugby defense. With fringe defense watching the pick and go they can’t accelerate immediately and instead the outside comes up faster.
As a result, Chisholm can see that there is more speed on his outside ready to smash the tip on option. Therefore he naturally uses his inside option looking to regain some partial territory. This movement entirely stems from three of the four carries from the lineout being unable to break the wall.
Had Cavubati been able to carry strongly and carry on Lang’s momentum it would have enabled Chisholm to have more options instead of Goneva, who became partially isolated and again the ball was slowed.
However, once Quins made momentum they could easily spurn it. This is best shown in the amount of Errors, they made. They lost the ball to handling error on 14 occasions compared to Ulster’s 6.
This is a continuation from the attack before, Quins making a line break following 2 carries before which had made yards beyond the wall. With one of the best ball playing front rows flipping the ball inside, and Lewies making a break. Where Ulster made 3 breaks in the example above (minutes before) and held the ball lewies is unable to hold on.
Breakdown of where Harlequins played the game. Pinned in their Own 50 and Own 22 for 43 of their attacks.
This caused some real problems for Quins who were unable to take advantage of their breaks. The mistakes also came for the majority in their own 50. This fed a seemingly inescapable cycle. Ulster able to pin back Quins in their Own 50, who would escape before losing the ball and being forced back.
Overall, Ulster were able to strike effectively from set pieces, the majority of tries coming from immediate strikes. However, the grinding nature of the game meant the precision of Ulster to keep Quins pinned back and turn the screw before Quins finally broke and made an exit from Europe.
It what has been heralded a more important victory than in 1995, SA took home the William Webb Ellis Cup and returned home to joyous celebrations. Whilst these celebrations are extravagant, creative and incredibly colourful, they are the opposite of SA’s gameplan which was pragmatic.
While this may sound like I am another turning the knife into a boring team, they were anything but. Their attack, based on percentages returned a great victory and should be a model that teams build from not throw in the bin in the hope of an aesthetic attack.
South Africa work by an ethic of restricting the opposition and stopping them playing their own game. This can be seen in the game against England. England prior to the game had averaged 56 platforms, with an average of 47 alone in the knockouts. This shows how England had an attack based on a dominance of possession and controlling as much as they could. However against South Africa, they had 37 attacks.
Graph showing how effective SA shut down Englands strengths
This drop of 19 from their tournament average is a significant drop in ball retention and game control. For a team so well drilled, as Squidge Rugby pointed out, and wanting to control the instances they can, a drop of 19 is deadly. Throughout the games preceding the final they averaged, 0.67 points per platform. In the knockouts alone, they averaged 0.63 points per platform. This drop therefore can be seen to lead to a drop of roughly 12.73 points, (11.97 in knockouts)
While this alone would not have overturned the difference, it is a crucial consideration in assessing how extraordinary SA’s tactics were. They brought a game plan which disrupted England and stopped them getting what they needed, possession.
However, South Africa also slammed the door shut when England had possession. They dropped England’s success from 0.67 to 0.32. The rapid line speed is nothing new from SA, having showed it in previous games. They restricted England’s access to their 22, to just one start.
England obviously didn’t help themselves, some poor errors as well as a break from their traditional structure made the SA defence’s job easier. The Springbok took full advantage and stopped the progression and forced England side to side.
Take this example from an attack in the 20th minute.
Lawed and Tuilagi have a slow clear out, following a dominant double tackle from the Springboks
England have just come from a line out, slightly shy of the 22m. Then they go through a few phases and have had 2 phases prior, May trying to cut inside and a crash from Mako Vunipola. The pace at which the move flows is was what normally helps England to strike. Therefore the crucial aspect is the double tackle from Kolisi. Not only forcing Tom Curry back but also having him present the ball upward slowing the ball down.
This is crucial as it allows SA to organise for a split second and crucially, it allows their defence to align for the next phase when England switch the ball.
England switch direction but SA are able to cover relatively easy with lots of pressure from Fat de Klerk
The lack of momentum from the previous carry forces England to try and play blind, whilst also possibly trying to expose a naturally narrow blindside South African defence. However, SA are wise to the danger with Faf de Klerk shooting and making a strong tackle against Billy Vuinopola , with his slightly larger friend Eben Etzeberth working to cover the offload to Farrell.
These two tackles are clearly linked and the series of events, were synonymous with England’s failure, not due to a poor start but due to a game plan which was found out by their opposition. By trusting a physical game plan you have got to hope that you win the battle of the gainline, however England didn’t.
SA were so strong they recorded a firmness rating of 94.5% in defence. This means that England not only made few breaks from which to generate momentum but rarely made a dominant carry which allowed them to gain any advantage.
This was the beauty of SA throughout the tournament. They consistently prevented teams playing their style and a bruising and efficient defence helped to curtail any sides aspirations, of making history.
Instead, the trophy was lifted by it’s first black captain. A marker for Rugby, and South Africa. But while the politics was incredibly important. I am not the person to right about it. Therefore, I hope I have shown it was the manner in which SA went from final favourites, lucky to be there and a walkover, Champions of the World, all based on their strength of nullifying the opposition. Which created the secondary storyline in a most emotional game.
England have been, in my opinion the best team. They have based everything around a solid structure building slowly and progressively. Whether they’ve reached their pinnacle in this game remains to be seen but overall, this has been their best game of the tournament, a scary thought for South Africa on Saturday.
England were able to neutralise New Zealand completely. This is what allowed them to record an all important victory. Take a look at this example from the 7th minute. England have conceded turnover ball, and whilst perhaps, they seemed slow to respond and dive on the ball, they were able to shut down New Zealand.
However worse still they have majority of their line caught on the wrong side of the break down, a sign of their aggressive attack plans. However, whilst New Zealand are able to throw it wide and make ground it is the response of the blindside that shuts down the move.
The line on the blindside doesn’t scramble. While the closest 3 or 4 drift diagonally the outside stays relatively straight, not corner flagging but aligning for the next phases. This plan is a success and shuts down the move later, and is supported by the work of the closest defenders. England have 4 defenders in a swarm to shut down New Zealand after they play past Daly.
New Zealand are at their most dangerous when playing through defences, but position 4 defenders stilts the All Black momentum. By shutting down the passing it also allows the remnants of line to form and shut down the second phase without conceding as much yardage.
This is helped by the slight split, in the defence. Itoje is sat deeper allowing a more aggressive point just ahead of him. While this is only a slight differentiation, and perhaps doesn’t play a large role, Itoje acting as a sweeper and the push on the outside means Barret is cut off close to centre field rather than allowing NZ to push it wider and have both playmakers on their feet.
By cutting him down in centre field, it also allows them to fold and then form a double line. This means they can defend aggressively on both sides, with the outside pushing hard. On the near side of the image this forces Reece to cut back inside. Whilst this leads to a ‘missed’ tackle for Mako Vuinopola on the inside, it has stalled New Zealand’s momentum.
This allows aggressive line speed again. This time Manu Tuliagi performs the shooting role, getting in the channel and grabbing an interception. As a result it means New Zealand are on the back foot, rather than converting a break which they would be expected to build from.
This is what eventually told the tale of the semi final. New Zealand pinned back, able to escape for mere portions of the game. New Zealand started 19 attacks from their own 22, 13 more than England. To give this some context, in their demolition of Ireland the All Blacks started 5 platforms in their own 22, and kept Ireland starting there 13 times. So whilst NZ had a high exit rate of 57%, the England team kept turning the screw.
Wales served up the closest game of the Quarter Final leaving it late to roll over a defiant France team. The French proved incredibly stubborn, having soared out to an early lead, however it could and should have perhaps been more.
France based their game plan on the fast start. HAving taken an early lead they kicked Wales back. France kicking 82% of the ball and controlling the game, this was an amazing amount almost 30% more than their game against Argentina.
Wales however didn’t help themselves. A low variation in attack meant they seemed unable to break the French defence down. Wainwright and Moriaty tries both came from turnover rather than scoring from a well planned attack. Wales had made only 34% progression in their game v Australia, only just improving to 48% against France. Yet it will be there defence they will be worried about. Conceeding 72% progression against France, showing that when meant with fast runners out wide they can be exposed.
France started strongly scoring within the first five minutes. The french crashed over after a strong maul exposed wales. This dragged france within a few meters, while the staggered carry allowed them to crash over.
However it was the 7th minute French try that will have worried Wales. They struggled to deal with attacks in the wide channel again. The French overloading that channel and flooding it with powerful runners.
Vakatawa begins an attack with a simple step to beat Navidii. The Welsh defence seemingly going through the motions. The overdrift when you are equal in numbers a simple error.
Vakatawa wriggles through an over drifted Welsh defence to set France free
From this france then cut through and transition into a V formation. With options on both sides descending on the welsh. This allows them to convert the opportunity. There is nothing particularly special in the way that engineered the chance, or converted it. This is what makes it even more spectacular. The simplicity of creating a killing machine, which carefully disposed of the welsh defence.
France make a V formation to provide support on both sides of the ball and help them to convert the chance
However the Welsh defence eventually got back into the contest. The scramble has become a key part of the Welsh defence. The nature of a fast defense, is that when in behind, you have to work and prevent any opportunity being converted once your line has been breached.
Take this example from the 3rd minute. France have broken through twice, Wales are in retreat and it looks like France will score.
France make an outside break but Tipuric produces a steal to prevent a score.
Having been beaten out wide, Wales combine to make a double tackle but can’t prevent the inside path. Yet Tipuric hauls down the inside runner. This is made possible by staying in line with him. The importance of this can’t be overstated. If he strays slightly in front then the opportunity will be lost, as his momentum will most likely trap him underneath. However by syncthing round the ball from side he can flip himself back over and jackal using the momentum of the tackle.
The scramble defence was also shown later on, when France make 2 successive probes. Wales manage to turn the first over through some oppressive defence. By using the shooting in they force a poor pass and Hadleigh Parkes can get across to cover on the outside.
Welsh rush defence ends in a Watkin turnover as Wales escape
This pressure forces a turnover from which Wales clear. However the ball stays in and France spread the ball attacking a tired Welsh line.
France shifting the ball immediately, gives a new onus to the attack. With Wales having to tread water as their forwards have been dragged between breakdowns. The drift tackle is missed by Tipuric and they cut through.
Gareth Davies and George North shut down the opportunity working to cut off the inside Balla and an offload off the floor.
As you can see, Davies holds inside with both him and Dan Biggar working to provide immediate guards. This prevents an immediate crash from France working. This efficient drift system allows Wales to fill the holes. Tipuric and Wainwright are also able to filter in, protecting the fringe with a bit more ballast, and allowing Biggar to recommit once the threat has been countered.
Owen Watkin slows the French attack whilst Adams finishes it off
It is this recommitment from Wales which so successful. Ball and Wainwright who have just worked from the previous line to more central positions are able to reset periodically. However, it is the slowing of the ball by the spot defense of Watkin that creates the monster hit, and the periodical rest. Preventing clean ball allows Adams to rush in and finnish the job.
That final piece sums up the welsh defensive system. Owen Watkin allows Josh Adams to finish the job. Rather than all being committed to one role, Watkin is acting as an instigator. The spot defence creating an opportunity. This mindset of being instigators and work ethic carries ver to an attack however which lacked creativity. The lack of variety helped Wales to almost choke themselves out of a game, they should have won more easily. France did nothing spectacular but could have run away if it wasn’t for important interventions. Yet Wales did even less. A simple worry, with a less than easy fix going into a semi final.
The Analysis Guy 