England began their knockout campaign with a test against a strong wallabies team. England had won the previous 6 encounters since being dumped out of their home world cup and Cheika was looking to change the script.
England hadn’t really been tested or needed to show anything spectacular whilst Australia had come with a different plan to most teams, keeping ball in hand, kicking only 42% of ball against Wales with Wales themselves kicking 60% of the ball away. However despite this, they had made lots of ground, progressing 60% of the time, the baulking runners, Kunadrani and Koribete proving to be a handful. This is the game, England were fighting against. One based on possession and running, the clash of style was to make for an interesting game.
The difference can be found just by examining three of the tries. The Koribete try, coming from a lovely inside flick from Jordan Petia, Johnny May’s first try and the Kyle Sincklers try. For England both their tries revolved around a very formulated, incredibly controlled Pod based system. Whilst Australia ditch the mainstay of structure offering lots of singular one off runners creating 2 lines of options spreading their forwards rather than condensing them.
Johnny Mays first try comes from sustained pressure. England started off with a lineout just inside the Australian 50m area. The crash immediately from Tuilagi gives England momentum. While pods can be used for options, the key about the pod surrounding Tuilagi is that it prevents any Australian attempt to win the ball and allows the move to flow.
England then spin it wide, the attack relying on Elliot Daly acting quickly and freeing Watson. By carrying hard Watson makes it up to the Australian 22 but crucially has forced Australia scramble. By really attacking the width and forcing this scramble it has actually brought Hodge, Koroibete and Kerevi into make the tackle. This means as England switch direction, Hodge has to work to get to the other wing, while also shortening the Australian defence.
England then play the ball flat. The two options of Farrell showing that England have momentum, no longer needing two dedicated cleaners. Tuilagi has also simply been able to carry on his line of inquiry. Not having to drift into attack closer to the ruck, instead England maintain their width and strike strongly.
This also allows Tom Curry to sit wider, the flanker playing more as a link man than a crashing physical ball carrier.The simple completion and the width is best shown by the fact that Hodge has had to cover probes on both wings, whilst England have barely had any additional commitments, Tuliagi and May holding their Width and forwards filtering and fitting the England shape.
The Koribete try came from some pressure originating in Australia’s own half. The Austrailians
Rather than relying on the pod systems instead used width and staggered lines to stretch England. The attack ran with little subtlety, but the ability to stretch England allowed a floated pass to find Pettita out wide. The ball coming inside and allowing Koroibete to run.
While this seems like a short description, overall the Australians were able to find width and this is what stretched England. Using 1 flat runner held the defence slightly but the damage had already been done.
Working to the edge of England’s rapid defence, the skill from Petatia to flick inside with a micro pod out wide just gave options where Australia needed it. This in essence is the key to attack. A varied game plan with resources where they are needed, is now becoming a crucial aspect of the game plan. While, Rugby geeks can talk about 2-4-2 formations and the benefits of a 1-3-3-1, the simple truth here was demonstrated by Australia.
They crashed in the centre, worked to an edge and then used two micropods across two phases in totally variant roles to expose the space. The first pod act as cleaners generate space and time for the backs out wide, where Petatia has multiple options preventing England from making an easy decision and nullifying the attack.
Kyle Sincklers try, showed a second string of the English bow. The crash runners are used again. The ball coming to the lead an often playing off 10. This time moving to Watson with more slow build up, than May’s first. The use of lead men and a traditional pod system being used repeatedly, however, more off 10 than off 9. This keeps Australia entertained, knowing the danger of the lifted ball to a short, lateral runner.
The English have worked to a width. England then play inside back toward the centre. Vuinopola receives the ball, with both him and Sinckler shielding Farrell from Australian pressure. This gives Farrell time to play the ball.
This ability for Farrell to pick a pass and perform it is crucial. While everyone talks about playing close to the line, this only works by starting deeper. It is like a battlefield commander sitting on his horse and surveying a battlefield. Whilst if in the infantry line he can see a small chink perhaps, when sat back and given an overarchign view, he can use his forces to expose spaces and create new ones. Giving himself time to perform rather than worrying about being ‘’killed’’ whilst performing the simple skill.
Then after flicking the ball to Sam Underhill, Farrell is able to reorganize and this time, he has a pod off his shoulder containing Curry. England then secure quick ball allowing Farrell to use his reserve playmaker, Elliot Daly. The Full Back came into action again in the wide channels. Quickly and most importantly cleanly to the waiting Anthony Watson. This allows England to make use of the full width of the pitch. Whilst not spreading the ball as quickly as in their first try or as simply as Australia, England’s use of width through variety proved decisive.
Having reached the wide channels, the ball got played back inside. Mako Vuinopola carries again and then Farrell shifts the ball as England overload the centre channel and Kyle Sinckler takes the flat pass. By using such ballast to create opportunities and then knowing when to go wide to finally prepare the Australain defence was crucial.
As I have referred to on countless occasions during this piece, it was England’s variety which led to the ease of victory. Whilst Australia were committed to a wide game plan they were no different to Wales. The excitement of such wide play papered over the cracks of having an incomplete game. England on the other hand announced themselves as a real and present danger, with a high variety of 31.7%. This ability to change their attack and change the game based on themselves was the key. Australia did prove some threat but the Wallabies were a one trick pony, which England were able to restrict and defeat.
The Analysis Guy 