In this piece, I aim to show, 1) why SA were able to exploit a Canadian side who struggled to cover the back field, 2) why Canada were able to exploit SA at points, and 3) why Canada’s heart and at points, how their level of effort exposed them. While they started slowly and were put behind and beaten by half time, the second half showed promising signs as they put up a staunch resistance.
One of the main problems Canada faced early on was the inability to cover the back field. They were restricted, and SA kept them pinned back with clever kicking. However, when Canada did drop back to cover the space, it enabled SA to attack the now-uncovered 15m channel. This is clever management by SA, exposing Andrew Coe and Jeff Hassler especially. This was a perfect piece of rugby engineering to target the Opposition weakness: Jeff Hassler playing only for one season (Seattle Seawolves in the MLR has not been exposed to top Tier 1 rugby since he last played for the Ospreys two full years ago), whilst Andrew Coe has been predominantly devoted to Canada 7s in recent years, which is not at Super Rugby level.
This disparity in team levels allowed SA to prosper and take advantage of a Canadian team which had struggled throughout. But the ability to kick in behind and really control the Canadian back field enabled SA to apply pressure, manifesting itself statistically in 48% possession kicked (for reference, NZ kicked under 30% of possession against Canada).
The two instances below really show how SA exposed Canada with their kicking game.The inclusion of a second playmaker in Francis Steyn, as well as a Northern Hemisphere-based player in Cobus Reinach, allowed them to really control the game and gave them 3 comfortable kicking options with Elton Jantijies included.
This first instance comes from a turnover on a Canadian lineout ball. The South African ability to steal the ball is not surprising, but the adaptability and play immediately following this turnover is key. Schalk Brits receives the ball and shifts it out to Jantijies, who in turn quickly passes to a flat Steyn. With SA flat, having been prepared to defend, Steyn kicks in behind.
With only two players covering the back field – having expected to keep possession – Canada are exposed.
The Canadians were also exposed from another mistake allowing SA to use a pendulum kick. Having boxed kick and winning the ball back, they kick across to the other side of the field, exposing a tightened defence.
Snyman reclaims the ball after Canada are unable to diffuse the box kick from the Springboks. The short carry from Snyman with a small offload allows SA to attack and gain momentum while Canada automatically scramble. The drawing in of multiple Canadians allows the kick from Steyn moments later.
Perhaps the Canadians had been expecting SA to attack. However, due to the lack of options Steyn kicks in behind into an undefended right wing, exposing a Canadian back field with only one player. The kick runs just enough for Nelson to cut it off behind his line and gain Canada a 22. And while the kick is not on a highlights reel, it reveals a key tactic for SA.
To some degree, the game was used by Rassie Erasmus as a dress rehearsal for SA’s Quarter Final, practicing strategies, as well as testing his reserve squad. In this regard, the game was a great exhibition: Reinach’s hat-trick, showing Erasmus he should have no worries at Scrum Half, whilst Steyn and Jantjies are more than comfortable deputies. Meanwhile, Canada may harbour some worries, the loss of their lineout and missing a kick to give SA a great platform and strong scoring ability against them.
However, Canada can be pleased with how they were able to stem the flow in the second half. The game illustrates the Canadian weakness in moving forward with only a forward momentum of 18.4%, compared to a score of 42% against NZ. No doubt this was a major plus for the Bokke defence. In the future, Canada will want to rebuild and begin to really tighten up defensively and be much more dynamic in attack.
The Analysis Guy 