While lockdown continues the rugby void still needs to be filled. So I have looked back instead at a game in the English Premiership, in order to see what learnings can be taken for when rugby takes. In the following piece, I examine how Exeter converted two opportunities through fly half Joe Simmonds to expose Harlequins. Both tries start from transition based platforms and the skill used to attack from these platforms is marvellous, as Exeter shows how to create and crucially finish opportunities from within a simple but effective structure.
The first try begins from a kick receipt, in Exeter’s Own 50m area. The Harlequins box kick comes from a typical caterpillar ruck. However, while this creates a protection for the scrum half, it does mean that a weakness in the defence is created which Exeter can later expose.
Olly Woodburn takes the catch and then proceeds to attack the defence, crucially getting on the outside of the initial tackler. This means he drags in additional defenders, with both Chisholm and Dombrandt having to make the tackle. Woodburn’s leg drive is also critical because he creates quick ball and the momentum. By hitting the ground with his knees, Woodburn has forced a tackle on his own terms. The supporting players are also dominant, as Ewers wearing 6 matches Woodburn’s position and drives across preventing Chisholm from driving back, while loosehead Alec Hepburn drives from the openside acting as a ballast. Hepburn also manages to lock in Dombrandt who is forced to release the tackle. This allows Nic White to start Exeter’s attack from the clean ball, following a dominant carry.
As Exeter have retreated from the kick they have been able to retain width and stretch Harlequins. This develops an overlap on the open side, due to Quins underfolding. This overlap has placed pressure on Danny Care. Having worked across from his box kick, Care enters the line at pace, and has to enter the line rather than occupying the traditional sweeper role. This leads to a disconnect within the Harlequins line being created and Exeter, through Sam Simmonds, break through the middle.
Danny Care, circled in light blue, has rushed from the defensive line. He initially aims to apply pressure to the Exeter fly half, but due to the overlap has to immediately drift across with the ball. Care is unable to control his speed so while he pushes ahead he creates a whole in the defence. This is shown by the short red line, where neither Care or Lasike are able to cover. The final part of the Quins defence which is exposed is caused by the previous box kick. The box kick and it’s protection has meant forwards are grouped on one side of the field, and that there is a large gap between the forwards and Danny Care in defence. The lack of cover means that Simmonds can attack into the Quins 22. Woodburns carry from the kick, also meant that the Quins backrow, 6 – Chisholm and 8 – Dombrandt are caught in the previous ruck and the gap is being covered by a lock. This creates the disparity in speed that Simmonds can take advantage of.
Following the break, Exeter continued with high tempo play. Harlequins overload the blind side of the ruck, this opens up the hole on the inside of Cavubati. White makes significant ground from his snipe but it allows Quins time to regain structure.
Exeter lost some speed for the next phase with White trapped in the ruck. The carry from the prop is crucial, as while slower it has two roles. Firstly, it draws in two Harlequins tacklers, with the secondary tackler being caught on the ground. Secondly, it begins a trend of same way attack. Following the break Exeter’s attacks traveled in one direction, towards the “sunny” side of the pitch. This same pattern is present in the following phase as well.
The following phase Exeter attacked the same way again, this time playing “Off 10”. The tight line drags in 3 Harlequins tacklers. The width of the carry is also important as it leaves Harlequins short on the blindside, and Harlequins backrow all fold on to the “sunny” side of the pitch.
By examining the phase from a tighter angle the magnitude of carry can be seen. Elvis Tainoe makes the carry targeting the middle of the Harlequins defensive pod. This is effective because it forces all 3 defenders to make the tackle. The slight wrapping of Exeter players to the right side, then helps drag additional Quins around with 5 Harlequins defenders folding around the ruck. Lambert returns from the tackle, and fills the guard position on the left hand side and fills the defence. This means a slow fringe defence is in place and Exeter can strike.
As Harlequins have overfolded, Nic White switches play. White has multiple options on his snipe. His extra steps across the face of the Harlequins defence draws the Quins. The slight block by screen runners causes multiple Quins defenders to be dragged in. Nic White is able to pull it back to Joe Simmonds who attacks and begins challenging the wider Quins defenders.
The inside sniping by Nic White and the use of forward screens has opened up the Quins defence. This is shown in the different angles of the defenders. While the inside defender has a total ball focus, the outside defender is drifting from a deeper position and is covering the outside two defenders. Simmonds gets outside of the inside defender to finish. The burst of acceleration beating the defender.
This first try then is an exquisite example of attack from a kick. By attacking and identifying where the Quins defence were unable to match Exeter numbers. This attack through transition uses a simple structure, with players knowing their roles and stretching Harlequins. The second aspect of the attack was the control and composure used in Harlequins 22 with a methodical build up before identifying a weakness. With Harlequins scrambling Simmonds acted calmly to beat the man opposite and work around the covering Harlequins defence to finish a fantastic attacking sequence.
The second try comes from another form of transitional attack, with the attack starting from a stolen 4 man lineout. This meant that they limited the defensive opposition and relied on winning two key categories, the race off the floor and the positioning of the pods.
Harlequins use a simple dummy jump to unbalance the chiefs lineout. However, the dummy jump is easily read so Exeter doesn’t lose the structure of the pod. This is important because the pod is fixed allowing a quick jump from the floor. Harlequins are then disadvantaged because Exeter win the space and comfortably steal the ball.
Following the turnover, Exeter began to set a platform. As Exeter were preparing to defend they had little depth, so simply crashed the ball from the start. Marcus Smith applies pressure, aiming to stop Exeter from spreading the ball wider. Smith does attempt a tackle but is easily dismissed, so Robshaw and cover from the lineout are forced to make the tackle.
Exeter then entered a 2-1 pattern, with a carry attacking openside and aiming to drag the Harlequins defence to the openside, in order to open the blindside.
As Exeter strike blindside, Harlequins have remained aligned and there is little room for Exeter to attack. The pull back pass is slightly ineffectual as the screen runners make no impact on the covering defence. However, due to the added width Exeter have begun to set up their structure on the left with a clear pod of 3 forwards. So while the 2-1 hasn’t manufactured an overlap or opportunity, it has reached the width which Exeter will use as a springboard for their attack.
The structure attack takes a very simple shape. Joe Simmonds at Fly Half has 2 options on his left, with a tip line and a pull back, green circle, available. This means that the 3 defenders outside of Dombrandt, red arrow, are forced to assess the options. However, the beauty of the formation is Woodburn, circled in blue. Simmonds has stood opposite Dombrandt fixing the number 8 wider. This opens the inside for Woodburn as the Harlequins defence is slow to fold around the ruck. While this doesn’t lead to a linebreak it creates momentum and allows Exeter to attack.
Following the break, the ball comes loose. However, Exeter are able to adapt, and due to the strong carry from Woodburn attack onto the ball and take advantage of disorganised defence. Elvis Taione has remained in the wide channel, and is able to round the defence and use his strength to beat Gabriel Ibitoye. This carry drives Exeter to the 22, and as a result it creates momentum and enables them to attack.
This break leads to a try from Simmonds individual brilliance. But the strike is still enclosed within a structure. Nic White has sniped from the base of the Taione ruck, this interests the guard defenders, who have raced back and have not realigned with the outside defence. This is best shown through Lamberts positioning, with the Harlequins prop still returning to the defensive line. The Chiefs also screen Simmonds, who steps through the line and then strikes, beating the remaining Quins defenders.
The second try is then scored by a piece of individual magic at its end, however, the build up is entrenched in simple structures which are easy to adapt into. The lineout sparked a simple 2-1 attack, which helped to stretch the Harlequins defence. Then the strike back which used Olly Woodburn from the inside, allowed Exeter to easily generate momentum. The adaptation from the spilled ball, with Elvis Tainoe breaking down the wing. Then yet again the simple structure used by Chiefs enabled Joe Simmonds to use individual talent and flair to score.
The combination of the two tries, both coming from a transition based platform – the first from a kick, and the second from a lineout steal – all combine to show how structure and flair can be used to generate a score. The simple nature of both scores, with an identification of the opposition’s weakness and having a controlled approach enabled the score. Nic White plays a crucial role in allowing Chiefs to score, as he snipes and offers a threat to the defence and manipulates it for his team mates to expose. The tries of course are also wrapped with a level of structure, which develops the opportunity. The structure will always be a necessary part of the attack but the identification by Simmonds of space and the breaking of the structure to challenge the defence and take advantage of the flaws created by the structure is exquisite.
Exeter has shown then, how to create an opportunity. Firstly through identification of overfolding and creating of mismatches, and for the second try by being reactive and entering a simple shape, while they readied for an attack. The breaking of the structure to score is also key, but it is the shape which creates opportunity in the first place.
The Analysis Guy 